

## Book Reviews

Gavriel D. Rosenfeld, *The World Hitler Never Made* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)

**Reviewed by Sheri Berman, Political Science, Barnard College, Columbia University**

Gavriel Rosenfeld's *The World Hitler Never Made* is an exhaustive (and occasionally exhausting) examination of alternative histories of the Nazi era—portrayals of worlds in which the Nazis won World War II, Hitler was never born or survived the Second World War, or the Holocaust never happened. This book is the place to go to delve into the controversy surrounding the *Star Trek* episode where the crew beams down to an alternative Earth and is forced to let a pacifist (Joan Collins) die so as to save the world from a Nazi victory; or learn of a comic book in which Hitler is kidnapped by aliens and forced to fly around the universe forever to pay for his sins; or relive a Saturday Night Live skit in which Überman (Dan Akroyd) saves his Führer (Michael Palin) from a dastardly plot to murder him with a suitcase bomb. But the book is more than just a treasure trove for Nazi obsessives. Rosenfeld's collection and analysis of dozens of what he calls "allohistories" (alternative histories) should also be of value to those interested in how perceptions of the Nazis and the Second World War have changed over the years.

Perhaps the most important theoretical divide in studies of the Nazi era, and the study of history more generally, is between those who emphasize structure and those who emphasize agency. Did the rise of the Nazis and the outbreak of the Second World War result primarily from unpredictable decisions made by specific individuals, or did they flow almost inevitably from deep-rooted structural sources? Since history is not an experimental science, many have attempted to answer this kind of question through counterfactual

analysis—trying to uncover a particular variable’s significance by removing it from the picture and arguing that the events in question would or would not have played out similarly.

*The World Hitler Never Made* reveals that popular treatments of such topics are riven by the same divide as professional ones, with some allohistories turning out the same (showing the influence of structure) and some turning out different (showing that agency matters). For example, allohistorical narratives of this era often involve someone going back in time and killing Hitler before his rise to power. Whether this truly changes history, however, depends on the author’s theoretical framework. Stories in which Hitler’s death matters reflect a belief “in the primacy of individual decisions and actions.” Stories in which his death does not matter reflect a belief “in the greater power of structural forces.”

Interestingly, Rosenfeld’s research reveals that nations vary in their attribution of primacy to structure versus agency. “It is significant,” he notes, “that most structuralist accounts have been Anglo-American in origin, while narratives emphasizing the pivotal role of individuals have tended to be German.” This makes sense because Germans, by stressing the actions of certain individuals, can avoid difficult questions about how their past and culture may have contributed to the rise of Nazism and the outbreak of the Second World War—while stressing long-term structural causes allows the British and Americans to portray German history and culture as fundamentally different from their own.

*The World Hitler Never Made* can also be read as a study of how the nations involved in the Second World War have “re-imagined” their identities during the postwar era. Rosenfeld argues, for example, that in the years immediately following the Second World War, British allohistories tended to follow a standard line: Germans were “uniformly depicted ... as brutal representatives of a criminal regime” while the British were portrayed as “heroic resisters” (35). In such stories, the differences between the British and Germans are unambiguous and the consequences of a world ruled by the Nazis dire. The moral or implication of these allohistories is clear: the decision to fight the Nazis was necessary and just and the British have a history of which they can be proud.

Over time, however, this type of black and white narrative begins to give way to a far grayer one—a trajectory that Rosenfeld argues

reflects the widespread questioning of Britain’s national myths and identity that accompanied the loss of empire, economic decline, and subservience to the United States. Hence already by the 1960s allohistories that portray the British as collaborators, or imagine a Britain populated by “home-grown” Nazis, or paint less one-sided pictures of the Germans, become increasingly common. That, as time passed British allohistories stopped portraying the Germans as uniquely and uniformly evil, and openly questioned the moral superiority of England (and the U.S.) reflects, in Rosenfeld’s view, the changing self-perceptions (and confidence) of the British.

Rosenfeld’s analysis of American allohistories reveals a somewhat different trajectory. Like their British counterparts, American allohistories produced during the immediate postwar era almost uniformly portray a moral and heroic United States and an evil and insatiably expansionist Germany. Perhaps the best-known allohistory of this period, William Shirer’s “If Hitler Had Won World War II” (published in *Look* magazine in December 1961), fits clearly into this category. In Shirer’s story the U.S. is defeated in the Second World War as a result of a joint German-Japanese invasion and is then occupied by the two Axis powers. The part of the country occupied by Japan is ruthlessly exploited for its natural resources, but otherwise is left more or less alone. The German-controlled parts of the country, on the other hand, are subjected to a regime of totalitarian terror: American Jews are eliminated and the rest of the population is essentially enslaved. The message here is clear: the decision to intervene was necessary and just and the Nazi regime was the antithesis of American values and traditions.

As in Britain, the nature of American allohistories begins to change in the 1960s as Vietnam and the civil rights movement cause the country to question its values and traditions. During the 1960s and 1970s allohistories that raise questions about American intervention and paint more nuanced pictures of both the Nazis and the Allies become more common. However, such “revisionist” allohistories are much less widespread than in Britain and by the end of the century a return to the more straightforward portrayals of an evil Nazi regime and a moral and just America become more common. This, Rosenfeld argues, reflects the fact that Great Britain underwent a much more critical and far-reaching reevaluation of its national

myths and identities during the postwar era as well as the boost in self confidence America received with the collapse of communism.

Not surprisingly, German allohistories reflect yet another pattern. To begin with, Germans produce far fewer allohistories than the British or Americans and those that they do produce appear much later. This is probably not a reflection of any lack of imagination or sense of humor, but rather a consequence of the more difficult and sensitive nature of the country's past. Indeed, up through the 1980s those few allohistories that were produced by Germans consistently "affirmed the horrific character of a Nazi-ruled world" (184). The moral of such stories was clear: the Nazis were evil; the regime's defeat and the country's occupation were liberation.

Rosenfeld does, however, detect some shift beginning in the late 1980s. At around this time growing numbers of conservatives began to argue that the time had come for Germans to put the Nazi past behind them and begin to create a more "positive" identity. Although this did not result in a flood of allohistorical treatments of the Nazi era produced by Germans themselves, Rosenfeld argues that Germans' avid consumption of Anglo-American accounts of Hitler winning World War II probably reflects a growing desire to "be liberated from the burdens of remembrance and [a willingness to] adopt a more carefree attitude" to the past (185).

In short, *The World Hitler Never Made* argues that a study of allohistories can reveal at least as much about the memory and interpretation of historical events as it can about the events themselves. Assuming Rosenfeld's cataloguing and description of these allohistories is correct (and one should be careful, I think, about drawing overly broad conclusions from such a strange and varied mishmash of stories), the genre does reveal that in Great Britain in particular, but also in the U.S. and Germany, there has been an abandonment of moral absolutes, an increasing willingness to question the superiority and motives of the Allies, and if not a growing sympathy for, than at least a more nuanced understanding of Germans and the conditions that brought into being and sustained the Nazi regime, over the course of the postwar era.

Such trends reflect larger tendencies in both the historiography and popular perceptions of the era, and Rosenfeld suggests that by bringing such ideas to a wide audience through books, films, comics,

etc., allohistories may in fact have directly contributed to these developments. Whether this is in fact the case is hard to judge. But regardless of whether allohistories should be seen as "independent" or "dependent" variables (to use social scientific jargon), there is no doubt that they are entertaining and odd, and, if Rosenfeld is to be believed, reveal a lot about both the countries that produce them as well as about the ways people think about and use history.

Terri Givens, *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)

**Reviewed by David Art, Political Science, College of the Holy Cross**

Why have radical Right (RR) parties been able to attract voters and win seats in some states and not in others? Terri Givens provides a compelling answer to this question, while at the same time demonstrating the insufficiency of many of the standard explanations. Her central argument, built upon rational choice assumptions and inspired by the work of Gary Cox, is that radical Right parties are less likely to succeed in electoral systems that encourage strategic voting (when voters cast votes for a party that is not their first choice). She offers a model of coalitions and strategic voting, and then tests it on four cases—Austria, Denmark, France and Germany—as part of a "most similar systems" research design. Given's is one of the few books on the radical Right that is both rigorous and comparative, and it deserves a great deal of attention from both students of RR parties, of party systems, and of European politics more generally.

Much of the book, chapters two to four in particular, is devoted to background information, defining concepts, and clearing space for the central argument. Givens describes a "radical Right" party as one that works within the existing political system, as opposed to fascist or extreme Right parties, to forward anti-immigrant or nationalist programs. Although Given's claims that anti-establishment messages are a common feature of such parties, one might question whether

this still applies as several radical Right parties, including both the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Danish People's Party, are either in government or prop up minority governments. While students of the radical Right will not find much new in Givens' descriptions of the central RR parties in the four states, she should be commended for conducting interviews with influential RR politicians, including Bruno Mégret of the French National Front (FN) and Susanne Riess-Passer, formerly of the Austrian Freedom Party.

Chapter Three is concerned with demonstrating that the social bases of RR support do not vary dramatically across countries. "What is remarkable about radical right parties in Western Europe," Givens notes, "is not the differences in their electorates, but the similarities, no matter the level of electoral success" (44). Drawing on extensive survey data, Givens argues that RR voters are more likely than the average voter to be less-educated, young, male, and blue-collar (66). Although this conclusion will strike students of RR parties as uncontroversial, it is important because it allows Givens to reject the hypothesis, made most forcibly by Herbert Kitschelt, that these parties are attracting different types of voters, and that such differences can account for cross-national patterns of success and failure.

In Chapter Four, Givens challenges the view that socioeconomic variables alone can account for differences in the success of RR parties. A number of scholars have argued that immigration, unemployment, or a combination of the two have a direct effect on RR party vote share. Givens tests these hypotheses using data from the Land level in Austria and Germany, and from the regional level in France. Her statistical analyses find that while the presence of unemployment and foreigners is positively correlated with RR votes in Austria and France, this relationship does not hold in Germany. Furthermore, Givens find that the direction of causation in the Austrian and French cases is uncertain. She notes that "radical right parties in France and Austria could be expending more resources in regions where unemployment and immigrants are considered a problem, or voters in these areas may be more responsive to the message of the radical right" (85). In sum, Givens finds, along with a growing number of scholars, that "demand-side" explanations—those explanations that focus on the attributes of particular voters or on the socioeconomic forces that influence their attitudes—cannot tell us why the RR

has done well in some places and not in others. What is needed is more attention to the "supply side," on the rules and strategies that structure partisan political competition.

Having convincingly rejected alternative explanations, Givens constructs her own rational choice institutionalist explanation in Chapter Five. Her central claim is that at least some voters who would otherwise vote for RR parties will consider a vote for such parties as "wasted" under certain electoral systems. A vote will be considered "wasted" when voters believe that a RR party has no chance of being part of a coalition, either because high effective thresholds work against smaller parties or because other parties effectively signal their intention not to form a coalition with the radical Right. Electoral institutions structure both the expectations of individual voters and the strategies of mainstream political parties.

Chapters Six and Seven test this model on four cases. Before analyzing the data, however, Givens first explains which electoral systems and coalition structures encourage strategic voting and which do not. She argues that voters in Austria are less likely to vote strategically because they expected (at least between 1986 and 1999) that a grand coalition between the mainstream Left and mainstream Right parties would be formed in any event. In France, the single-member dual-ballot system (SMDB) encourages voters to strategically abandon the FN in the second round of elections. In Germany, the 5 percent threshold encourages strategic voting while the 2 percent threshold in Denmark gives little incentive for it. Moreover, since Danish voters expect minority governments to be formed, they are more willing that they otherwise would be to vote for smaller parties, such as the radical right Danish People's Party. In both Germany and France, strategic coordination by mainstream parties increases strategic voting.

What is the empirical evidence for strategic voting in Germany and France, and its relative absence in Austria and Denmark? Givens provides an exit poll from the 1999 Austrian elections which strongly suggests that there was little strategic voting in this case, but she unfortunately lacks similar exit poll data for the others. She thus devises a number of clever tests to measure the level of strategic voting. Givens herself admits that the evidence is suggestive, but certainly not conclusive, for the German case. She appears to be on

firmer ground in both the French and Danish cases, but given the general difficulty of determining strategic voting without actually interviewing voters, it would be best to say that her evidence is consistent with her hypotheses but does not confirm them.

I am convinced that strategic voting is occurring in both Germany and France, and that the “rules of the game” are an important reason for the failure of German RR parties to gain votes and French RR parties to win seats. I am also persuaded that voters in both Austria and Denmark do not perceive a vote for RR parties as wasted, and that both the Austrian Freedom Party and the Danish People’s Party have profited as a result. Givens’ focus on the strategic behavior of mainstream parties toward the radical Right is also welcome, as this important dynamic has been undertheorized. In the end, she largely succeeds in her goal of providing a “more nuanced understanding of the role of party strategy and party agency in the success of the radical right” (153).

This said, I have several disagreements with Givens’ analysis. While I agree that strategic voting was not frequent in Austria, I am unsure that Austrians voted sincerely because they expected a grand coalition to be formed. Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, the main conservative party (the Austrian People’s Party, ÖVP) never ruled out a coalition with the FPÖ, and nearly formed one in 1995 before finally doing so in 1999. Might not voters have considered a vote for the FPÖ as valuable (or at least not “wasted”) because the coalition signals from the ÖVP were ambiguous? This is not necessarily inconsistent with Givens’ argument about strategic coordination, or the lack thereof. I wonder why she did not treat coalition signals in more depth in the Austrian case. I think that her notion that the grand coalition “made sending coalition signals irrelevant” could be reformulated (100).

Following Cox, Givens argues that the particular PR system in Germany acts against smaller parties. Yet, she herself notes that several smaller parties, such as the Greens and the Party of Democratic Socialism (PSD), have been able to emerge and survive. It thus might not be that the 5 percent threshold is doing all the work in creating strategic voting, and that the coalition signals of the mainstream parties toward RR populist parties are the driving factor. Givens does mention that the strict policy of non-cooperation with the radical

right (*Ausgrenzung*) means that the Republikaner and other far-Right parties cannot become part of a coalition, but again more attention to coalition signals would have been welcome.

These minor points aside, the main unanswered questions in Givens’ analysis is why political parties coordinate (or fail to coordinate) against radical Right parties. To be fair, this was not a question that the author specifically posed. Yet, it does appear from her analysis that the strategies of mainstream parties emerge more or less automatically from the “rules of the game.” French parties rule out cooperation with the FN because the majoritarian electoral system allows them to, and because such a strategy is in their long term interests (122). But why then did they enter into electoral deals with the FN in the mid 1980s, even before the brief interlude of proportional representation from 1986-1988, and in certain regions in the south thereafter? Germany’s electoral systems permits the mainstream parties to induce strategic voting, but what is to prevent the Christian Democratic Union from signaling its willingness to form a coalition with a RR party, as other conservative parties have done elsewhere in Western Europe? Put another way, is it really true that the “rules of the game” determine party strategies, or might something else (culture? historical legacies?) influence the willingness of mainstream parties to cooperate with the radical Right?

Givens claims that “cultural issues and historical factors need not be invoked to understand the varying level of success of the radical right” (9). I disagree, but I am glad to have such a fine piece of scholarship to argue with. Scholars will certainly apply Givens’ model to other countries, and I will be interested to see their results.

Steinar Stjernø, *Solidarity in Europe: The History of an Idea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

**Reviewed by Aaron P. Boesenecker, Government, Georgetown University**

Tracing the history of an idea is always a difficult enterprise. Ideas take on different meanings in different contexts, the very words and concepts used to express an idea change over time, and distinguishing the idea itself from its effects is no easy task. One often gets the feeling of aiming at a moving target while the ground simultaneously shifts underfoot. In *Solidarity in Europe*, Steinar Stjernø combines elements of intellectual history with comparative research on political parties and societies to present a detailed account of how various conceptions of solidarity developed throughout Western Europe from the late 19th century to the present day. This work is a complex and ambitious attempt to systematically compare numerous manifestations of an admittedly diffuse and amorphous concept. Although Stjernø does not entirely elude the pitfalls associated with the analysis of ideas, he does present a thorough and insightful study, rich in evidence and thought-provoking in content.

The fundamental insight throughout the volume is that it is impossible to talk about “solidarity” as a single or unitary idea. Emerging as a general response to the social and economic dislocations caused by early capitalism, solidarity took on a unique meaning within individual European political parties and societies. Much of the literature on solidarity stems from sociological perspectives that view the concept as a unitary phenomenon that contributes to social order, without disaggregating the concept across time or geographical space. Such accounts also do not specify the mechanisms through which solidarity contributes to order. In contrast, Stjernø approaches the question from a political scientific perspective, developing a comparative study on how and why the idea of solidarity has varied across Europe. This approach focuses attention on the actors that have played a role in constructing various concepts of solidarity, and sheds light on why different ideas gain validity within different contexts. On a conceptual level, *Solidarity* thus speaks to the more sophisticated questions concerning how ideas matter in political science, and

how they should be studied. Substantively, though it is not stated explicitly, the work is also concerned with the relationship between solidarity and the future of European welfare states.

The volume is divided into an introductory theoretical chapter and three substantive sections. The first section traces the intellectual heritage of various conceptions of solidarity, the second section presents empirical evidence from party platforms and elite discourses to illustrate the evolution of solidarity, and the final section addresses modern thought and the contemporary challenges to the concept and practice of solidarity. A common analytical framework is used throughout the work to compare different conceptions of solidarity by distinguishing four dimensions: the foundation (interdependence, class interests, ethics, religion); objective or function (realization of interests, social integration, equality); inclusiveness (restricted to certain classes or not); and collective orientation (the balance between individual autonomy and collective requirements).

Stjernø traces out the intellectual lineage of the idea of solidarity in three succinct chapters treating classical French social theory with its emphasis on interdependence and social integration (Comte, Tönnies, Durkheim), political solidarity in its working class formulation (Marx, Lenin, and Bernstein), and religious solidarity as expressed in Catholic and Protestant social ethics. Based on these lines of thought, Stjernø identifies seven distinct conceptions of solidarity that, in turn, serve as foils for the analysis in the empirical chapters. Wide variation among these conceptions makes it difficult to systemize the results, yet Stjernø does identify two elements of a general idea of solidarity: an identification of individuals with others, and the existence of a feeling of community. While the conceptual chapters (presumably designed to be illustrative rather than exhaustive) are noteworthy for their brevity, they tend to read like laundry lists of all individuals that once mentioned solidarity rather than a systematic investigation of an evolving concept. The summary tables at the end of each chapter are useful for comparing various conceptions of solidarity, yet greater attention to the interplay among these conceptions would counter the impression that ideas of solidarity grew up independently of one another.

Stjernø presents the bulk of his empirical evidence in the second section of the book, which traces the evolution of solidarity within

eight social democratic parties and three Christian democratic parties.<sup>1</sup> He limits the analysis to those parties that have expressed solidarity as a goal, and concentrates on a close reading of written party platforms together with the statements of party leaders, elites, and theorists. The German Social Democratic Party (SPD) is highlighted as a vanguard in advancing themes associated with solidarity and sparking discourses in other states, despite the fact that the party was destined to nearly 100 years in political opposition and was unable to bridge class divisions as easily as other social democratic parties.<sup>2</sup> Surprisingly, little additional attention is devoted to the diffusion of ideas, as emergent solidarity discourses are presented as independent, isolated processes. This assumption is questionable given the degree of interdependence in Europe even during the late 19th century, and the perspective is even more problematic as the analysis moves to the contemporary context.

In contrast to the German SPD, Scandinavian social democratic parties developed a cross-class solidarity discourse early on and also enjoyed early and lasting electoral success. Stjernø's treatment of the unique "productivist" variant of solidarity in postwar Scandinavia is particularly enlightening. In emphasizing the duty of an individual to work *and* feel responsible for others, solidarity was transformed into a positive (and inclusive) value to legitimate growth, social reform and increasing the standard of living, rather than class struggle. Interestingly, in a turn of events not addressed by Stjernø, the productivist discourse was later utilized in Denmark in the 1990s to legitimate a substantial reorientation of the social welfare system towards a means-tested, rather than universalistic, conception of welfare.<sup>3</sup> Stjernø unsatisfactorily attributes this reversal to the resurgence of economic liberalism in the 1980s, without explaining why a common exogenous shock influenced Denmark differently than Sweden or Norway. Examining how a prior solidarity discourse was deliberately employed to undo a present conception would have added depth to the overall account, and would counter an implicit teleology in the volume that sees ideas of solidarity as steadily evolving towards more inclusiveness and acceptance.

Stjernø also examines solidarity discourses in Britain, where the Labour Party has actually never made explicit reference to the concept, and in Southern Europe, where solidarity discourses have

struggled to overcome Marxist foundations and to reconcile class-based identities with religious loyalties. Social and Christian democratic concepts of solidarity are distinguished by the emphasis on individual effort and responsibility within Christian democratic parties, as contrasted with an emphasis on redistribution and "non-traditional" freedom (e.g., freedom from need) in social democratic parties. Both types of party share general themes such as freedom, solidarity, and justice, and although Christian democratic concepts of solidarity are not as standardized as their social democratic counterparts, they more easily span class divisions and include a European dimension. Much like the broader picture among all parties, though, Christian and social democratic conceptions of solidarity are becoming less distinct over time.

The lengthy empirical chapters are detailed and informative, yet are also repetitive, hampering a systematic comparison between the concepts. In places, one almost has the feeling that the author is trying too hard to find hints of a solidarity discourse (e.g., in the British Labour Party or Christian social ethics), as the matter-of-fact presentation suggests an underlying assumption that a discourse is to be found if we only look hard enough. However, teasing out vague notions of solidarity from each party platform does not necessarily contribute to our understanding of the idea as much as thoroughly analyzing why alternative concepts might be more valid in certain contexts.

The chapter containing general comparison between various concepts of solidarity contains some of the volume's key insights. In general, solidarity has become more inclusive, accommodating movements and social classes (ecology, gender, minorities) beyond just labor, and has become less radical, as class struggle and revolution were replaced with more pragmatic goals centered on policy change and participation in government. The achievement of individual and class interests has been replaced by ethical or value-based goals such as freedom, justice, equality and social integration, and the emphasis on the collective is balanced by themes of individual freedom. Although the concept and language of solidarity are now solidly developed and spelled out in party platforms, the modern idea of solidarity is in many ways more ambiguous than its classical counterparts. Unfortunately, the author's review of modern social thought and proposal for a contemporary conception of

solidarity does not clarify the situation. The paragraph-long definition emphasizes diverse themes: standing up for the underprivileged; political altruism over personal interest; communicative action; a preparedness to share resources and allow state redistribution; and a will to collective action institutionalized through rights and citizenship. While these are all noble goals and ideals, it is difficult to see how this rather haphazard combination of Jürgen Habermas, the welfare state, and enlightened self-interest can provide inspiration or guidance to European parties and societies, much less be translated into political action.

In a prescient final chapter, Stjernø highlights the present-day challenges facing the concept of solidarity—namely individualization, consumerism, and globalization. Yet the discussion here is largely superficial, and the call for global solidarity and an international order based on democracy and the rule of law comes across sounding more like a pipe dream than a serious response to the very real challenges facing European societies. Yet, given that modern solidarity is based on inclusiveness and sympathy for those in need, Stjernø also observes a troubling paradox: extending solidarity to encompass the poor, minorities, immigrants, and the oppressed clashes with the reluctance of political parties and elites to employ the concept in areas that might produce voter backlash—precisely those areas such as minority and immigration policies where the concept needs to be applied. Moreover, traditional ideas underpinning solidarity such as the idea of reciprocity are not easily employed in the modern context of highly asymmetrical relationships (rich/poor, majority/minority, citizen/immigrant). This divorce between the idea of solidarity and the strategies chosen by political parties constitutes one of the chief challenges to political action and social cohesion in Europe. It seems that the idea of solidarity has become so broad as to be devoid of meaning, rendering it useless in precisely the areas where it is most desperately needed.

To rescue the relevance of solidarity, and the idea itself from demise, Stjernø revisits the linkage between solidarity and the European welfare states. In his discussion of social democratic parties, Stjernø turned received wisdom on its head, noting that solidarity was institutionalized into party programs well after the main elements of the welfare state had been established, and that social

democratic parties only linked solidarity and the welfare state in the latter part of the 20th century. In the closing chapters, the author invokes solidarity as a crucial basis for the modern welfare state, which, in turn, offers a bulwark against liberalism, individualism, and all manner of ills confronting European societies. This move raises the question as to whether the idea of solidarity itself can create or restructure social relationships, whether this is an interactive process (which seems most plausible), or whether social reality creates the idea. Throughout the work Stjernø himself vacillates on the point, at times asserting that solidarity grew out of concrete social structures and relationships, and later maintaining that collective action is needed to reshape society since solidarity will *not* grow automatically out of the social structure. In doing so, he skirts the central question of whether ideas exert an independent influence, or are merely reflections of underlying social (material) conditions. Undoubtedly, changes in class structure, political constellations, and prevailing ideas have challenged and reshaped the idea of solidarity. But, if ideas are merely a reflection of underlying conditions, as Stjernø implies, then it is problematic to fall back on these ideas as solutions to the changing conditions and challenges facing European societies.

Stjernø's desire to separate idea and effect notwithstanding, a discussion of the history of an idea must also deal with its effects. Ideas are not simply handed down from on high, nor do they exist in a vacuum. They evolve in interaction, struggle, and conflict with competing ideas; their transmission and institutionalization is a complex process involving numerous actors. This unresolved tension in the volume stems primarily from the top-down, elite-driven story of solidarity that Stjernø presents. In the end, it is an incomplete picture of the concept that ignores the social and political context within which an idea exists and evolves. Because Stjernø does not address the question squarely, the reader is left somewhat puzzled as to the actual relationship between the idea of solidarity and the social world.

In short, taking ideas seriously means discussing what they do and how they matter, and analyzing the concrete mechanisms by which they are transmitted, institutionalized, challenged and renegotiated.<sup>4</sup> To maintain, as Stjernø does, that ideas matter, is difficult to reconcile with an analytical framework that pays attention only to the elite expression of these ideas and locates the sources of change

in underlying material conditions. That the idea of solidarity has changed over time is an important insight, but perhaps unsurprising; it remains superficial unless accompanied by attention to the implications these changes in such a powerful idea have, and how these ideas in turn are embedded in (and influencing) a larger social and political context. Overall, Stjernø presents a thorough history of the various ideas of solidarity expressed through European party and elite discourses. The sheer volume of research into individual party platforms is remarkable, and the sections on intellectual history ranging from Christian social ethics to modern social philosophy are impressive, if somewhat disconnected. In trying to accomplish many things, the work falls just short in its attempt to systematically link the evolution of solidarity to the implications of this ideational shift. Nevertheless, *Solidarity* is both timely and insightful as a work in political history that also sheds light on the pressing challenges to social and political cohesion facing European societies.

## Notes

1. Social democratic parties include the SPD (Germany), SAP (Sweden), DNA (Norway), Socialdemokratiet (Denmark), SFIO/PS (France), PSI (Italy), and PSOE (Spain). Christian democratic parties include the CDU (Germany), DC (Italy) and KRF (Norway).
2. This in itself is an interesting puzzle that Stjernø explains away as a consequence of “the authoritarian character of the German Reich.” Such a cursory treatment of an interesting empirical puzzle is neither enlightening nor consistent with the scholarly nature of the rest of the work (at another point Stjernø accounts for the close match between CDU policy and Vatican teachings with reference to “German thoroughness”). The author would be well advised to either delve into such puzzles with rigor or leave aside the superficial generalizations.
3. See Robert Henry Cox, “The Social Construction of an Imperative: Why Welfare Reform Happened in Denmark and the Netherlands but Not in Germany,” *World Politics* 53 (April 2001): 463-498.
4. Mark M. Blyth “Any More Bright Ideas? The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy,” *Comparative Politics*, 29, no. 2 (1997): 229-250; Sheri Berman, “Ideas, Norms, and Culture in Political Analysis,” *Comparative Politics*, 33, no. 2 (2001): 231-250.

David Monod, *Settling Scores: German Music, Denazification, and the Americans, 1945-1953* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).

**Reviewed by Ivan Raykoff, Arts Concentration, Eugene Lang College, The New School for Liberal Arts**

Germany’s *Stunde Null* (zero hour) of 1945 has often been represented as a new political, economic and cultural beginning for the defeated and war-ravaged nation. The arts, music in particular, were a necessary part of this rebirth and reorganization, since the Nazi regime had exercised deliberate and damaging control over all cultural institutions as part of its social and political projects and war propaganda. From Beethoven to Wagner, Germany’s rich musical legacy of the nineteenth century—an integral part of German national identity—had been particularly distorted by fascist ideology. Highly-esteemed composers, conductors and performers active in Germany during the war years—among them Richard Strauss and Herbert von Karajan—were also implicated to varying degrees in the regime’s politics and its system of rewards.

In recent years a number of scholars have explored the complex interplay of musical life and politics under the Third Reich, but few have examined these issues in the immediate postwar period, that is, the years of Allied occupation when significant efforts were made towards the country’s cultural reorganization. In *Settling Scores* David Monod details American efforts to “denazify” the culture of classical music in Germany between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War. He focuses on the activities of the Music Control Branch of the Military Government’s Information Control Division, and on the American officials who navigated, with debatable success, the contradictory impulses of retaliation and rehabilitation that characterized Allied efforts to reform German society during the occupation period.

Monod contextualizes his historical account through larger philosophical questions about the relationship between art and ideology in theory and in practice, and the moral responsibility of the artist faced with the choice between resistance and survival. As the author explains, “the book asks readers to confront the question of the cul-

pability of the artist, but it wants them to do so in the context of a time and a place and to understand what was possible, what was known, and what was thought then to be right” (4). This has always been a tall order, but Monod assists by presenting a view of that historical time and place informed by extensive archival research as well as insights gained from interviews with a number of the American officials who charted a course of action through that thicket of tradition, politics, ethics and economics.

*Settling Scores* is organized thematically and chronologically into three broad sections. The first covers the initial occupation period (1945-46) when American denazification efforts were characterized, as Monod presents it, by the conflicting approaches of “hard-peace” and “soft-peace,” or punitive purge and democratic reform. The former approach, pursued by the Intelligence Section, advocated censorship of cultural programming and the wholesale blacklisting of prominent artists who had been active under the Third Reich; it demonstrated an essentialist view of German character and the assumption of the country’s collective guilt for the war. The latter approach, pursued by Music Branch officials, was more idealistic and accommodating: it aimed for the revitalization of cultural life through positive example and influence instead of compulsion, sought out exonerated Germans to resume concertizing and arts administration, and promoted music (especially works by American and foreign composers) that had been intentionally neglected or banned by the regime. The author presents the values of these two approaches even-handedly, emphasizing the challenges faced by officials in reconciling them in practice, but does occasionally seem to favor the whip instead of the carrot. As he assesses the reformers’ idealistic vision, Monod claims that “branch officers adopted a definition of collaboration sufficiently weak as to allow them to find good Germans even among Hitler’s supporters ... And while they asserted that they had to act like democrats to teach democracy, they neglected to mention that the locals only complied with their wishes because they had bayonets against their backs” (41).

The book’s second section covers the transitional years (1946-50) when American denazification efforts were stymied by a lack of consensus among the occupying Allied forces (the Soviets pursued the task with quite different assumptions and intentions) and the

establishment of a new independent German political system that granted more responsibility for reorientation to the Germans themselves. The subsequent clearance of blacklisted musicians such as conductors Wilhelm Furtwängler and Karl Böhm and pianist Walter Gieseking are case studies for the unraveling of American initiatives. Monod interprets these reversals as “a sign that many Germans would not acknowledge the legitimacy of the occupation or accept that the Third Reich had been a culturally abnormal time” (174). In his most negative assessment of this transition, he states that the Germans pursued “a whitewashing of music life so indiscriminate that even the music officers would find it disgraceful” (95). Turning to more practical considerations, Monod also describes how the currency revaluation of 1948—the establishment of the Deutsche Mark in the Western sectors and the resulting economic upheaval—further compromised reorientation efforts by prompting a new conservatism in concert life, a reactionary turn away from the modern and internationalist art music that was supposed to broaden German musical tastes.

From a musicological perspective, the significance of modern music as an aspect of American reorientation efforts is one of the most intriguing threads in Monod’s account. Since Germany’s unmatched legacy of classical music had contributed to a sense of cultural chauvinism exploited by the Nazi regime, repertoire diversification was one way Americans tried to reform German musical culture, and contemporary music was a particular focus of this plan. According to Monod, music officials believed audiences “had to be taught that during the preceding twelve years far more interesting music was composed outside Germany’s borders than within” (116), and that this new music could provide “a way of creating understanding and harmony among peoples and of encouraging democratic thinking” (200). Music officials tended to promote more accessible modernist composers such as Americans Samuel Barber, Aaron Copland and Howard Hanson and the German émigré Paul Hindemith, among others. Works by atonal or avant-garde composers such as Arnold Schoenberg and Henry Cowell were relegated to specialized state-subsidized new-music festivals in Darmstadt and Donaueschingen, for example. In another context, Monod asserts that “in the postwar classical music field ... the new had become shorthand for exoneration” (259). Unfortunately, the author does

not document how and why contemporary art music specifically was supposed to promote democratic ideals or serve the project of denazification as officials seemed to hope, and he rates the effort a failure overall.

The book's final section focuses on the period after 1947 as resistance to communism took precedence over the faltering programs of denazification. Here Monod details notable examples of the successful reorientation of German musical life facilitated by American officials: Leonard Bernstein's celebrated 1948 concert with the Bavarian State Orchestra, Paul Hindemith's controversial return to Munich in 1949, the reopening of the "new" Bayreuth Festival in 1951, and the acclaimed production of George Gershwin's *Porgy and Bess* in Berlin in 1952. Overall, however, Monod rates American initiatives "insubstantial" (126) and seems to lament the "sorry end to this unfulfilled experiment" of radical denazification (260), which was "curtailed too soon and so badly that its ultimate impact was overwhelmingly negative" (9). True cultural reorientation did not occur, he suggests, because of the Americans' lack of coherence in policy and its uneven implementation, and because of "German resistance" (115) and "the cultural elite's resilient anti-Americanism" (252).

Paradoxically, Monod begins his book by claiming that "this study offers a more positive assessment of the American occupation than is common in the scholarly literature" (9), but here he seems to be referring to productive structural reforms in Germany's system of arts administration. In disentangling opera and concert life from the Nazi regime's political web, American officials had to find ways to insure "the rights of the public and the freedom of the artists" and to teach new government institutions "to accept the necessity of paying the piper without calling the tune" (27). The irony of this postwar situation—with the victors judging personal rights and freedoms as they called the tune—remains unquestioned, though it probably holds the key to further understanding of this complicated era and cultural debate.

Patricia Mazón and Reinhild Steingröver, eds., *Not So Plain as Black and White: Afro-German Culture and History, 1890-2000* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2005)

**Reviewed by Karen M. Eng, German Studies, University of Cincinnati**

This engaging collection of eight essays from contributors hailing from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds, concentrates on the study of the African diaspora in the German context. The volume is divided into two sections—the first provides an historical overview of Afro-Germans and the second, entitled "Cultural Representations and Self-Representations of Afro-Germans," delves into a lively discussion of Afro-Germans' representational positionality, with examples taken especially from pop culture. The essays taken as a whole, track the history of Afro-Germans and the evolution of the community's representation in the last century, while integrating vital consideration of how Afro-Germans have come to define themselves. Patricia Mazón and Reinhild Steingröver's editorial direction is topical and uncomplicated, creating a straightforward and readable volume with fascinating and unique examples taken from literary and cinematic culture appropriate for a diverse audience. Moreover, the layout of this volume extends the channels of study created by seminal text *Farbe Bekennen: Afro-deutsche Frauen auf den Spuren ihrer Geschichte* (To Show One's Colors: Afro-German Women Seeking their History)<sup>1</sup> by adopting a multifaceted, interdisciplinary approach to exploring historical narratives of German-African colonial contact and the impact on both representations of Afro-German self-narrative and mainstream depictions.

Russell Berman's foreword sets the tone of the volume, locating the discourse of Afro-German Studies within representational history and engaging the dialectics of emblematic, racial otherness within literature and culture. Berman's identification conceptualizes Afro-Germans in German culture in terms of W.E.B. DuBois' Pan-Africanism. Continuing along these lines, the editors probe the terminology "Afro-German" in their introduction, thoughtfully noting the difficulties of using this name, including the fact that many Afro-Germans do not self-identify with this designation. These complications reflect

the scope of the entire collection: there is a daunting complexity to narrating the various stories of a diverse group, while simultaneously knitting these diverse threads together. The interdisciplinary nature of this work is present, but not particularly highlighted, and this bypasses an opportunity to reflect on the positionality of the study itself: in terms of representation, where does an English-language study of this topic in an American press by largely American-trained scholars fit in? While it clearly occupies more than an interstitial space in mediating either that which is “African” and “German” or self-made narrative and mainstream representation of Afro-Germans, the volume’s professedly interdisciplinary approach and diversity of contributing scholars invites more discussion surrounding its own functionality within the this area of scholarship.

The first half of the volume most clearly marks its debt to *Farbe Bekennen*, developing the interwoven German-African historical fabric and offering several noteworthy lines of argumentation. Fatima El-Tayeb’s well-crafted analysis ties together nation, race, and German national identity, exploring these concepts by juxtaposing examples of “metaphorical blackness” (29). This includes recounting Ghanaian-German Gerald Asamoah’s recent membership on the German national soccer team with a persuasively linked examination of anthropological and Social Darwinist influences on the legal status of Afro-Germans. This combination of examples guides the reader nicely from the colonial period through contemporary times. Tina Camp’s thought-provoking essay convincingly and adeptly examines racial codification in the German-African context. Striking is her incorporation of body politics, gender, and race in terms of the threat of “contagion,” in which the white German body itself becomes the constructed paradigm of threatened victimhood, contamination, or “racial martyrdom” (102). Negative concepts of “blackness” were created as an oppositional concept to the purity of “whiteness.” Camp’s argument probes the function of racial difference at the extremities of material martyrdom and codified bodily sacrifice at critical points in the German-African timeline, bringing fresh perspectives to the volume’s overall historical contextualization of race politics.

The five essays in the second section of the volume provide unique case studies in theorizing the culture of Afro-German Diaspora within, outside or in direct opposition to clichéd ideas of

Afro-Germans. Ambitious in its scope, this section negotiates and renegotiates the image of Afro-Germans in cinema and literature, at times, hesitating to connect material life and cinematic or textual articulation. Tobias Nagl’s fascinating essay on actor and wrestler Louis Brody’s career, for example, makes the case that while mainstream German cinema was interested primarily in exotic and stereotyped roles for Afro-Germans, Brody’s potent appearance enabled him to play other, non-clichéd, even positive characters on occasion. Whereas Nagl identifies a “loss of individuality” (109) onscreen, he also argues that special circumstances in Brody’s career occasionally allowed for non-stereotyped roles. Unclear, however, is whether Brody’s very individual force of presence that created these atypical opportunities, was actually an extension of mainstream German cinematic manipulation. A stronger reading of Brody as an Afro-German in terms of his career would more closely align it within the volume’s overarching goals.

Other essays on film more clearly focus on the semantic meanings of race generated by cinematic representation. While covering different eras and considering a variety of points of view, Heidi Fehrenbach’s analysis of the 1950s’ “Toxi” films and Randall Halle’s consideration of anti-racist practices in contemporary films interact well together. Fehrenbach’s essay establishes a link between juvenile caricature Toxi and the trajectory of actress Elfie Fiegert’s career within the context of defining Germanness in material life and through cinematic representations. Similarly, Halle emphasizes multiple displacements of being female, lesbian, and Afro-German onscreen, as well observing an increased presence of Afro-Germans in film as a positive marker within the process of defining German identity. Both Fehrenbach and Halle closely follow not only the thematic emplotment of racialized bodies in the films they discuss, but also seamlessly draw on either historical factors (Fehrenbach) or cinematic relations (Halle) in the evolving culture.

In the only essay about literary representation, Leroy T. Hopkins engages the concept of narrating diasporic identity through lyrical and prose works. Arguing that contemporary Afro-German literature is primarily a “women’s literature” (183), Hopkins insightfully reviews recent Afro-German literary texts, while simultaneously maintaining a contextual tie to diasporic literary history. Furthermore, by thematizing

a variety of elements under the rubric of autobiographical experience, including sexuality, feminism, gender, race, childhood and adulthood anxieties, this article offers a broad view the contemporary Afro-German autobiographical voice in textual narrative.

While this collection's avowed goal is to examine Afro-German culture and history from 1890 to 2000, the question that drives that agenda is: how conceptually useful is the African diaspora to Afro-German cultural and historical studies? In the final essay, Anne Adams neatly closes the volume with an illuminating discussion of the function played by Afro-German diaspora studies, arguing that "academic debate offers valuable material for theorizing the unique formation of Black diaspora community and identity among Afro-Germans" (227). Adams cogently outlines the links between the politics of self-definition, communal identity and consciousness, theorizing the conditions under which a usable concept of diaspora may emerge.

In sum, there is a growing, but still very modest number of studies on this topic. This ambitious volume fulfills its goals of problematizing the notion of "Afro-German," as well as tracking the historical contacts between Germany and Africa. While there is a clear account of Afro-German history, however, this historical element disappears, becoming background for contemporary cultural studies. Afro-German history, long influenced by Germany's links to cultures abroad, is also tempered by current events, including Germany's position in the European Union and its postunification experiences. Continuing the narrative of Afro-German history, in addition to the attention devoted to current debates within cultural studies, would have lent more balance to the overall volume. Nonetheless, *Not So Plain as Black and White* offers several fresh perspectives and valuable scholarship to Afro-German studies.

## Note

1. Katharina Oguntoye, May Opitz, Dagmar Schultz, *Farbe Bekennen: Afro-deutsche Frauen auf den Spuren ihrer Geschichte* (Berlin 1991).