

building on established theory and providing empirical grounding to his arguments, Carrier has made an important contribution to the theoretical development of memory studies.

Though profoundly different in approach and style, these three books display interesting commonalities. All recognize the important role played by citizens' initiatives in triggering memorial efforts and influencing the terms of the debate. Leggewie and Meyer offer the most detailed account of the organizations involved in the Holocaust Memorial, but civil society is central to Till's and Carrier's arguments too. Each of the books sets a primarily national analysis in a transnational context, indicating that this dimension can no longer be ignored by memory scholars. Finally, and most importantly, none of these books is concerned with normative or aesthetic evaluations regarding how well monuments "work." They focus instead on the assessment of the political processes, actors, and the cultural and official functions fulfilled by Berlin's new memory district.

Book Reviews

Gavriel D. Rosenfeld, *The World Hitler Never Made* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)

Reviewed by Sheri Berman, Political Science, Barnard College, Columbia University

Gavriel Rosenfeld's *The World Hitler Never Made* is an exhaustive (and occasionally exhausting) examination of alternative histories of the Nazi era—portrayals of worlds in which the Nazis won World War II, Hitler was never born or survived the Second World War, or the Holocaust never happened. This book is the place to go to delve into the controversy surrounding the *Star Trek* episode where the crew beams down to an alternative Earth and is forced to let a pacifist (Joan Collins) die so as to save the world from a Nazi victory; or learn of a comic book in which Hitler is kidnapped by aliens and forced to fly around the universe forever to pay for his sins; or relive a Saturday Night Live skit in which Überman (Dan Akroyd) saves his Führer (Michael Palin) from a dastardly plot to murder him with a suitcase bomb. But the book is more than just a treasure trove for Nazi obsessives. Rosenfeld's collection and analysis of dozens of what he calls "alohistories" (alternative histories) should also be of value to those interested in how perceptions of the Nazis and the Second World War have changed over the years.

Perhaps the most important theoretical divide in studies of the Nazi era, and the study of history more generally, is between those who emphasize structure and those who emphasize agency. Did the rise of the Nazis and the outbreak of the Second World War result primarily from unpredictable decisions made by specific individuals, or did they flow almost inevitably from deep-rooted structural sources? Since history is not an experimental science, many have attempted to answer this kind of question through counterfactual

analysis—trying to uncover a particular variable's significance by removing it from the picture and arguing that the events in question would or would not have played out similarly.

The World Hitler Never Made reveals that popular treatments of such topics are riven by the same divide as professional ones, with some allohistories turning out the same (showing the influence of structure) and some turning out different (showing that agency matters). For example, allohistorical narratives of this era often involve someone going back in time and killing Hitler before his rise to power. Whether this truly changes history, however, depends on the author's theoretical framework. Stories in which Hitler's death matters reflect a belief "in the primacy of individual decisions and actions." Stories in which his death does not matter reflect a belief "in the greater power of structural forces."

Interestingly, Rosenfeld's research reveals that nations vary in their attribution of primacy to structure versus agency. "It is significant," he notes, "that most structuralist accounts have been Anglo-American in origin, while narratives emphasizing the pivotal role of individuals have tended to be German." This makes sense because Germans, by stressing the actions of certain individuals, can avoid difficult questions about how their past and culture may have contributed to the rise of Nazism and the outbreak of the Second World War—while stressing long-term structural causes allows the British and Americans to portray German history and culture as fundamentally different from their own.

The World Hitler Never Made can also be read as a study of how the nations involved in the Second World War have "re-imagined" their identities during the postwar era. Rosenfeld argues, for example, that in the years immediately following the Second World War, British allohistories tended to follow a standard line: Germans were "uniformly depicted ... as brutal representatives of a criminal regime" while the British were portrayed as "heroic resisters" (35). In such stories, the differences between the British and Germans are unambiguous and the consequences of a world ruled by the Nazis dire. The moral or implication of these allohistories is clear: the decision to fight the Nazis was necessary and just and the British have a history of which they can be proud.

Over time, however, this type of black and white narrative begins to give way to a far grayer one—a trajectory that Rosenfeld argues

reflects the widespread questioning of Britain's national myths and identity that accompanied the loss of empire, economic decline, and subservience to the United States. Hence already by the 1960s allohistories that portray the British as collaborators, or imagine a Britain populated by "home-grown" Nazis, or paint less one-sided pictures of the Germans, become increasingly common. That, as time passed British allohistories stopped portraying the Germans as uniquely and uniformly evil, and openly questioned the moral superiority of England (and the U.S.) reflects, in Rosenfeld's view, the changing self-perceptions (and confidence) of the British.

Rosenfeld's analysis of American allohistories reveals a somewhat different trajectory. Like their British counterparts, American allohistories produced during the immediate postwar era almost uniformly portray a moral and heroic United States and an evil and insatiably expansionist Germany. Perhaps the best-known allohistory of this period, William Shirer's "If Hitler Had Won World War II" (published in *Look* magazine in December 1961), fits clearly into this category. In Shirer's story the U.S. is defeated in the Second World War as a result of a joint German-Japanese invasion and is then occupied by the two Axis powers. The part of the country occupied by Japan is ruthlessly exploited for its natural resources, but otherwise is left more or less alone. The German-controlled parts of the country, on the other hand, are subjected to a regime of totalitarian terror: American Jews are eliminated and the rest of the population is essentially enslaved. The message here is clear: the decision to intervene was necessary and just and the Nazi regime was the antithesis of American values and traditions.

As in Britain, the nature of American allohistories begins to change in the 1960s as Vietnam and the civil rights movement cause the country to question its values and traditions. During the 1960s and 1970s allohistories that raise questions about American intervention and paint more nuanced pictures of both the Nazis and the Allies become more common. However, such "revisionist" allohistories are much less widespread than in Britain and by the end of the century a return to the more straightforward portrayals of an evil Nazi regime and a moral and just America become more common. This, Rosenfeld argues, reflects the fact that Great Britain underwent a much more critical and far-reaching reevaluation of its national

myths and identities during the postwar era as well as the boost in self confidence America received with the collapse of communism.

Not surprisingly, German allohistories reflect yet another pattern. To begin with, Germans produce far fewer allohistories than the British or Americans and those that they do produce appear much later. This is probably not a reflection of any lack of imagination or sense of humor, but rather a consequence of the more difficult and sensitive nature of the country's past. Indeed, up through the 1980s those few allohistories that were produced by Germans consistently "affirmed the horrific character of a Nazi-ruled world" (184). The moral of such stories was clear: the Nazis were evil; the regime's defeat and the country's occupation were liberation.

Rosenfeld does, however, detect some shift beginning in the late 1980s. At around this time growing numbers of conservatives began to argue that the time had come for Germans to put the Nazi past behind them and begin to create a more "positive" identity. Although this did not result in a flood of allohistorical treatments of the Nazi era produced by Germans themselves, Rosenfeld argues that Germans' avid consumption of Anglo-American accounts of Hitler winning World War II probably reflects a growing desire to "be liberated from the burdens of remembrance and [a willingness to] adopt a more carefree attitude" to the past (185).

In short, *The World Hitler Never Made* argues that a study of allohistories can reveal at least as much about the memory and interpretation of historical events as it can about the events themselves. Assuming Rosenfeld's cataloging and description of these allohistories is correct (and one should be careful, I think, about drawing overly broad conclusions from such a strange and varied mishmash of stories), the genre does reveal that in Great Britain in particular, but also in the U.S. and Germany, there has been an abandonment of moral absolutes, an increasing willingness to question the superiority and motives of the Allies, and if not a growing sympathy for, than at least a more nuanced understanding of Germans and the conditions that brought into being and sustained the Nazi regime, over the course of the postwar era.

Such trends reflect larger tendencies in both the historiography and popular perceptions of the era, and Rosenfeld suggests that by bringing such ideas to a wide audience through books, films, comics,

etc., allohistories may in fact have directly contributed to these developments. Whether this is in fact the case is hard to judge. But regardless of whether allohistories should be seen as "independent" or "dependent" variables (to use social scientific jargon), there is no doubt that they are entertaining and odd, and, if Rosenfeld is to be believed, reveal a lot about both the countries that produce them as well as about the ways people think about and use history.

Terri Givens, *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)

Reviewed by David Art, Political Science, College of the Holy Cross

Why have radical Right (RR) parties been able to attract voters and win seats in some states and not in others? Terri Givens provides a compelling answer to this question, while at the same time demonstrating the insufficiency of many of the standard explanations. Her central argument, built upon rational choice assumptions and inspired by the work of Gary Cox, is that radical Right parties are less likely to succeed in electoral systems that encourage strategic voting (when voters cast votes for a party that is not their first choice). She offers a model of coalitions and strategic voting, and then tests it on four cases—Austria, Denmark, France and Germany—as part of a "most similar systems" research design. Givens' is one of the few books on the radical Right that is both rigorous and comparative, and it deserves a great deal of attention from students of RR parties, of party systems, and of European politics more generally.

Much of the book, chapters two to four in particular, is devoted to background information, defining concepts, and clearing space for the central argument. Givens describes a "radical Right" party as one that works within the existing political system, as opposed to fascist or extreme Right parties, to forward anti-immigrant or nationalist programs. Although Givens claims that anti-establishment messages are a common feature of such parties, one might question whether